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    Abstract.  The draft allocation formula agreements
that have been prepared to implement the ACF and
ACT River Basin Compacts are both substantively and
procedurally flawed.  They are substantively flawed in
that they attempt to do indirectly what the states have
been precluded from doing directly.  They are
procedurally flawed in that that their development did
not include full participation by all relevant
stakeholders.  These inadequacies and related issues are
examined in the context of applicable federal legal
requirements.
INTRODUCTION
    The Apalachicola–Chattahoochee–Flint (ACF) River
Basin Compact (Public Law No. 105–104, 111 Statutes
at Large 2219) and the Alabama–Coosa–Tallapoosa
(ACT) River Basin Compact (Public Law No. 105-105,
111 Statutes at Large 2233) authorized the states to
negotiate allocation formula agreements for the ACF
and ACT River Basins, respectively.  The draft ACF
and ACT allocation agreements that have been prepared
to date emerged from a procedural history in which the
states attempted to circumvent the requirements of
federal law applicable to the management and
allocation of water resources.  (Hawk, 1997; Sherk,
2001)  These efforts were unsuccessful.  The ACF and
ACT Compacts as ratified reflect congressional intent
to preserve the “congressionally authorized purposes”
of federal facilities.  As former Speaker of the House
Newt Gingrich has stressed, ratification of the ACF and
ACT Compacts by Congress did not authorize the states
“to rewrite federal law.”  (Gingrich, 2001)
    Nonetheless, despite this legislative history, the draft
allocation agreements attempted to do indirectly what
the states were precluded from doing directly.
Specifically, the draft agreements sought to change the
congressionally authorized purposes for which federal
facilities were constructed.  The draft agreements also
attempted to limit the applicability of federal law.
These attempts raise a number of issues.
FEDERALISM ISSUES
    The states do not appear to recognize or understand
the distinction between physical and legal availability
of water.  States may exercise primacy over the
management and allocation of water resources only to
the extent that such resources are not needed to fulfill
the requirements of federal statutes and regulations.  As
Justice Douglas noted in Oklahoma ex rel Phillips v. Guy
F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534-535 (1941):
“‘Whenever the constitutional powers of the federal
government and those of the state come into conflict,
the latter must yield.’  Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12,
17, 47 S.Ct. 265, 266, 71 L.Ed. 511. ... [T]he suggestion
that this project interferes with the state’s own program
for water development and conservation is likewise of
no avail.  That program must bow before the ‘superior
power’ of Congress.”
    Neither the ACF Compact nor the ACT Compact
authorized the states to change the requirements of
federal law.  Nonetheless, review of the draft allocation
formula agreements leads to the inescapable conclusion
that the same individuals who failed in their attempts to
circumvent the requirements of federal law through the
compact negotiation and ratification process attempted
to achieve the same goal through the allocation
agreements.  Simply stated, those provisions of the
allocation agreements that change the use of federal
facilities are prima facie illegal.  Only Congress has the
authority to authorize federal projects and only
Congress can change the purposes for which the
projects are authorized.  (Thuss, 1990; Vest, 1993;
Carriker, 2000)
    Furthermore, any attempt by Congress to authorize
the states to change the requirements of federal law
(i.e., to change the purposes for which federal facilities
have been authorized) would be a violation of the
nondelegation doctrine.  (Sherk, 2001)  As noted above,
the Constitution vests all legislative power in the
United States Congress.  Given this requirement,
“Congress is not permitted to grant policy making
power to agencies when doing so would be an
abdication of its constitutional duty to enact
legislation.”  (Quandt, 2000)  In essence, while it is
within the authority of Congress to reauthorize the use
of the federal facilities located within the ACF and
ACT River Basins, it is not within the authority of
Congress to delegate the power of reauthorization to an
administrative agency such as the ACF or ACT
Commissions or to the states.  In addition, Muys has
noted that the authority delegated to the Federal
Commissioner by both the ACF and ACT Compacts
vis-à-vis approval of the allocation agreements may
also violate the nondelegation doctrine.  (Muys, 2001)
    Finally, it must be noted that the rivers of the ACF
and ACT River Basins are subject to the requirements
of a number of federal statutes and regulations.  As a
result, the regulation, control and allocation of these
rivers requires the full participation of several federal
agencies and related organizations.  With regard to
participation by the federal agencies in development of
the draft allocation formula agreements, former Speaker
of the House Gingrich has made the intent of Congress
crystal clear:  Federal agencies were to participate fully
“during the development of the allocation formula” and
were to “have equal participation in all technical
working groups and meetings in which the terms and
conditions of the allocation formula are negotiated.”
(Gingrich, 1997)  The former Speaker has reaffirmed
this conclusion repeatedly.  (Gingrich, 2001).
Nonetheless, despite the clarity of this directive, the
states chose to exclude the federal agencies and related
organizations from the process by which the draft
allocation agreements  were negotiated.  Many of the
negotiating sessions were held in secret (some under
the guise of “mediation” or the “exchange of technical
information”) from which the federal agencies and the
public (as well as several state agencies) were excluded.
The potential effect of such exclusions was summarized
by Copas who, after noting that “[a]ll users must be
accounted for and dealt with for a compact to be
successful[,]” concluded that “[a] compact that does not
account for federal drains on water resources is doomed
to fail.”  (Copas, 1997)
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
    Both the ACF and ACT Compacts establish a
concurrence/nonconcurrence procedure applicable to
review of the draft allocation formula agreements by
the Federal Commissioner.  Unfortunately, a critical
question that was not addressed when the ACF and
ACT Compacts were enacted is whether the burden of
proof rest with the states (to prove consistency with
federal laws and regulations) or with the Federal
Commissioner (to prove inconsistency).  The former
chief negotiator for the state of Georgia took the
position that the Federal Commissioner was obligated
to concur unless the Commissioner could point to a
specific statutory or regulatory violation.  (Moore,
1999)
    It is a well-established provision of American
jurisprudence that a party seeking governmental
approval (in whatever form that approval might take)
has the burden of demonstrating why approval should
be forthcoming.  This is particularly true when the issue
is use of public resources such as water.  With regard to
the use of water resources in Georgia, for example,
requiring the applicant to bear the burden of proof is
statutory.  O.C.G.A. §12-5-31(c) provides that, “[t]o
obtain a permit pursuant to this Code section, the
applicant must establish that the proposed withdrawal,
diversion, or impoundment of surface waters is
consistent with this article.”  The applicant, therefore,
bears the burden of proof.
    In a similar manner, the states bear the burden of
proving that the draft allocation agreements are
consistent with the requirements of applicable federal
law such as the Federal Power Act, the Fish and
Wildlife Coordination Act, the Clean Water Act, the
Safe Drinking Water Act, various Rivers & Harbors
Acts, various species protection statutes (including the
Endangered Species Act) and the Coastal Zone
Management Act.  In addition, to the extent that these
federal programs are implemented through programs
established pursuant to state law, compliance with the
requirements of applicable state laws would have to be
demonstrated.
    Compliance with procedural statutes, such as the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the
Administrative Procedure Act, would also have to be
demonstrated.  It has been argued, for example, that the
Federal Commissioner is precluded from concurring if
the requirements of NEPA have not been fulfilled.
    An additional procedural issue relates to
congressional approval of the draft allocation formula
agreements.  Not all interstate agreements are subject to
congressional ratification.  The Supreme Court has ruled
that only those interstate agreements “tending to the
increase of political power in the states, which may
encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the
United States” are subject to approval by the Congress.
Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893).
Irrespective, virtually all interstate agreements involving
the management and allocation of water resources,
because of their impacts on such federal issues as
navigation and commerce, require congressional
approval.  (Sherk, 1994; Grant, 1991)
    As noted above, the ACF and ACT Compacts
authorized the states to develop allocation formula
agreements.  The definition of “allocation formula”
contained in both Compacts included representation of
the apportionment via “a table, chart, mathematical
calculation or any other expression of the Commission's
apportionment of waters.”  The draft allocation formula
agreements that have been prepared to date go far
beyond the scope of the “allocation agreement” as
defined in the Compacts.  For all intents and purposes,
the draft allocation agreements are management plans
for both the ACF and the ACT River Basins.  As such,
the draft agreements increase the “political power in the
states” and appears to “encroach upon or interfere with
the just supremacy of the United States[.]”
Consequently, as the Supreme Court has made clear, the
draft allocation agreements would require congressional
ratification.  (Muys, 2001)
CONCLUSIONS
    The allocation formula agreements that have been
drafted for the ACF and ACT River Basins are both
substantively and procedurally inadequate.  They are
substantively inadequate in that they are based on a
fundamental misinterpretation of the ACF and ACT
Compacts.  Neither Compact, either directly or
indirectly, authorized the states to change the
requirements of federal law.  Furthermore, Congress
could not authorize the states to do what the states
attempted to do though the draft allocation agreements
without violating the nondelegation doctrine.
    The draft allocation agreements are procedurally
flawed in that the federal agencies and related
organizations that are directly affected by the
agreements were not involved in drafting them.  As a
result, if submitted to Congress for ratification, it is
quite likely that the draft allocation agreements would
face serious opposition by numerous governmental
instrumentalities.  Furthermore, the draft agreements
fail to acknowledge either (a) that the states bear the
burden of proving that the allocation agreements are
consistent with the requirements of federal law or (b)
that the allocation agreements will require
congressional ratification.
    Consequently, in their present form, the draft
allocation agreements are neither good law nor good
policy.  Except as first drafts of subsequent agreements,
the draft allocation formula agreements warrant no
further consideration.
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